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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII Section 4 of the 
Utah State Constitution, U.C.A. Section 78-2-2 (1953 as amended), 
and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment when it did not construe 
the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff and erroneously 
found that no genuine issue of material fact existed. 
2. Whether genuine issues of material fact existed as to 
whether Plaintiff was aware of facts that would have led her to 
conclude there was a reasonable possibility that her injury was 
caused by Defendants' negligence. 
2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff filed this action in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Weber County, alleging medical malpractice. (R. 1, 81). 
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, (R. 21), but 
the trial court denied Defendants' motion. Defendants then 
answered Plaintiff's complaint. (R. 110). Plaintiff then 
motioned for a separate trial on the issue of the statute of 
limitations. (R. 126). Defendants then moved for summary 
judgment. (R. 168). The facts presented to the trial court were 
disputed, but adopting Defendants' version thereof, the court 
found that no genuine issue of material fact existed, and 
consequently granted Defendants' motion. (R. 280). Plaintiff's 
moved to alter or amend the judgment, but the court denied the 
motion. (R. 351, 377 and 378). 
3 
Statement of Facts, 
(1) The following statement of material facts was submitted 
to the trial court in Plaintiff's Statement of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, dated October 18, 1989: 
a. Plaintiff Holli Mahoskey (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff"), has alleged that Defendants committed medical 
malpractice in failing to diagnose her breast cancer. 
(Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, paragraph 16.) 
b. Plaintiff found a small lump in her right breast 
in February of 1985. On April 3, 1985, she was examined by 
Defendant, Boyd Farr, M.D. to determine whether the lump was 
malignant. Dr. Farr attempted to aspirate the lump several 
times, and being unsuccessful, requested Defendant, Chris 
Christensen, M.D., to assist him in the examination. Dr. 
Christensen examined the lump and also attempted to aspirate 
it without success. (Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 6 
through 11; Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 1-2; Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint, paragraphs 11 and 12.) 
c. Both doctors used the same methods in examining and 
attempting to aspirate the lump. Both doctors were informed 
by Plaintiff of a family history of cancer, in particular, 
that Plaintiff's mother had contracted colon cancer, and 
that Plaintiff had first noticed the lump two months 
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previous to the exam. (Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 6, 7 
and 33; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 2.) 
d. During the April 3, 1985 examination, Plaintiff was 
told by the Defendants that she was too young to have cancer 
and, therefore, the lump could not be cancerous. Neither 
doctor mentioned or discussed any further tests or 
procedures to determine whether the lump was benign or 
malignant. Defendants simply told Plaintiff to continue 
regular breast exams and to come back for a check-up in 
three months. Plaintiff left the April 3, 1985 exam feeling 
that she had been properly examined and that the lump was 
not malignant. (Plaintiff's Deposition pages 11 through 13; 
Plaintiff's Affidavit page 2; Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, 
paragraph 13.) 
e. In July of 1985, Plaintiff noticed that the lump 
had begun to grow larger, and had become sensitive and 
sore. (Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 14, 15, 43 through 
46; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 2.) 
f. On July 17, 1985, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. 
James Gardner who observed that the lump had grown three 
times its original size and that it was clearly cancerous. 
This diagnosis was based on a biopsy performed that same 
day. On July 19, 1985, Plaintiff's right breast was removed 
in a modified radical mastectomy surgery. (Plaintiff's 
Deposition, pages 15 through 18; Plaintiff's Amended 
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Complaint, paragraphs 14 and 15; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 
2.) 
g. Plaintiff had contact with two other doctors 
pursuant to treatment of her breast cancer. Dr. Alton 
Wagnon supervised chemotherapy treatment and folJow-up. Dr. 
Conrad Monson performed sterilization surgery on the 
Plaintiff, to insure that she would not become pregnant 
during her six months of chemotherapy treatment. 
(Plaintiff's deposition, pages 18-21, 27, 49 and 50; 
Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 2-4.) 
h. Although Plaintiff questioned Dr. Gardner, Dr. 
Wagnon and Dr. Monson about whether Dr. Farr and Dr. 
Christensen should have diagnosed the cancer at an earlier 
date, each time she made such an inquiry, she was either 
told that they did not know, or she was told nothing — they 
did not answer her inquiries. Based upon such answers/non-
answers to the inquiries, PlaintLff concluded that either 
the doctors could not truly determine whether Dr. Farr and 
Dr. Christensen should have diagnosed the cancer, or that 
they had an opinion on the matter, but did not wish to share 
it with her. (Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 16, 18, 25, 27, 
37 and 38; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 3.) 
i. Dr. Wagnon told the Plaintiff, in August of 1985, 
that had the cancer been discovered earlier, it was possible 
that a less drastic operation, a lumpectomy, may have been 
sufficient to treat the cancer, but he could not be sure. 
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(Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 25 and 38; Plaintiff's 
Affidavit, page 3.) 
j. Other than Dr. Gardner, Dr. Wagnon and Dr. Monson, 
Plaintiff talked to no other doctors nor to any other 
medical professionals, prior to September of 1988, about 
whether Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen should have diagnosed 
the cancer in April of 1985. (Plaintiff's Deposition pages 
22, 24-28 and 51; Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 3 and 4 ) 
k, Although Plaintiff felt anger toward Dr. Farr and 
Dr. Christensen when she first discovered she Jiad cancer, 
and felt some suspicion that perhaps they should have 
diagnosed her cancer in April of 1985, she had no personal 
knowledge or basis for justifying such suspicion nor for 
forming an opinion about whether the doctors' examination 
of her breast lump was negligent or otherwise; nor was she 
able to determine by inquiring of her other doctors whether 
there was any basis for thinking that perhaps Dr. Farr and 
Dr. Christensen had acted negligently. Plaintiff also had 
no knowledge that other inexpensive tests existed that 
should have been performed to properly diagnose her cancer. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, pages 16, 18, 25, 27, 28, 35, 37, 
38 and 46; Plaintiff's Affidavit, page 4.) 
1. Plaintiff suffered devastating side effects from 
her surgeries and chemotherapy. Among other things, 
Plaintiff lost her hair and her immune system ceased to 
function normally. Consequently, Plaintiff constantly 
7 
suffered from illnesses, chronic weakened physiccil condition 
and continuous mental and emotional distress until lcite 
summer of 1988. The Plaintiff's continuous poor health and 
consequent concomitant stresses, in addition to her 
preoccupation with the foreseeable recurrence of the cancer, 
rendered the Plaintiff unable to work or rationally 
investigate the possibility that Dr. Farr and Dr. 
Christensen were negligent in failing to diagnose her breast 
cancer until September of 1988. (Plaintiff's Deposition, 
pages 23-24, 26-29, 34-35, and 47-53; Plaintiff's Affidavit, 
page 4; Affidavit of Dr. Alton Wagnon.) 
m. Plaintiff contacted Douglas M. Durbano, Attorney at 
Law, about her situation in October of 1988. Following a 
preliminary examination into the matter by her attorney, she 
was told that failure of Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen to 
give her a biopsy in April of 19 85 was probably negligent 
conduct, which could give her a cause of action. 
(Plaintiff's Affidavit, pages 4-5.) 
(2) Defendants, in their briefs and at the hearing on the 
Motions for Summary Judgment, emphasized their interpretations of 
statements made by Plaintiff at her deposition relating to the 
anger and suspicion she felt toward the Defendants at the time 
she discovered she had cancer in July of 1985. The Defendants 
interpreted these feelings of anger and suspicion OF the 
Plaintiff, that the defendant doctors should have discovered her 
cancer at an earlier date, as evidence of the Plaintiff's 
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knowledge or constructive knowledge in July of 1985 that she had 
sustained an injury due to negligent action on the part of the 
Defendants• 
(3) In Plaintiff's brief and at the hearing on the 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff 
emphasized the following facts to the Court: 
a. Although Plaintiff had feelings of anger and 
suspicion towards the Defendant doctors, suspecting that perhaps 
they should have discovered her breast cancer in April of 1985, 
she had no personal knowledge or experience from which to 
evaluate the possibility of negligence on the part of the 
Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff was unable to obtain information 
about the possibility of Defendants' negligence from her treating 
doctors in July and August of 1985, between the time she 
discovered she had breast cancer and the beginning of her 
radiation treatments for breast cancer. 
b. Between August of 1985 and September wf 1988, 
Plaintiff suffered side affects from her surgery and 
chemotherapy treatment, including frequent bouts of illness, 
continuing mental and emotional distress, and a chronic weakened 
physical condition. Because of her poor health and its 
concomitdut stresses, the Plaintiff was unable to rationally 
explore or evaluate the possibility that the defendant doctors 
were negligent in failing to diagnose her breast cancer. It was 
not until she returned to a reasonably normal physical, mental 
and emotional state in the late summer of 1988 that she was able 
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to address the issue of the possibility of the defendant doctors' 
negligence. 
(4) The trial court usurped the role of the trier of fact 
when it did not refrain from ruling on Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment even though the parties clearly presented a 
genuine issue of material fact; whether (a) the facts known by 
the Plaintiff and (b) the Plaintiff's state of mind in July of 
1985 showed that the Plaintiff knew or should have discovered 
through the use of reasonable diligence that she had sustained an 
injury and that the injury was caused by Defendants' negligent 
actions. Furthermore, the trial court did not view the facts in 
a light most favorable to the Plaintiff as required by Utah law. 
The Court ignored the facts as stated by the Plaintiff, and 
adopted the facts as proposed by the Defendants, in granting 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and in dismissing 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
(5) On January 16, 1990, the trial court signed the Order 
of Summary Judgment and entered that Order in this action on 
January 17, 1990. Thereafter, on January 23, 1990, the Plaintiff 
filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Summary Judgment under U.R.C.P. 
Rule 59. Memorandums of Points and Authorities were submitted 
by all parties on that Motion, and on March 16, 1990, the trial 
court signed and entered its Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Alter or Amend Summary Judgment. In its Order of Motion for 
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Summary Judgment dated January ^ 1990, the trial court ruled 
that "the Plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of an injury, 
its cause and the possibility of negligence in July, 1985...." 
11 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court was faced with the issue of whether Plaintiff knew or 
should have known she suffered a legal injury because of medical 
malpractice. The trial court held that Plaintiff had knowledge of 
the existence of an injury, its cause and the possibility of 
negligence in July of 1985. 
The trial court abused its discretion in determining its 
holding because, as required by Utah law, it did not construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. The trial court 
also abused its discretion because the case was not so clear as to 
find that no genuine issues of material fact existed as a matter 
of law. Instead, the facts, according to Plaintiff, indicate that 
at no time before August of 1988 did Plaintiff have sufficient 
facts for the trial court to determine that she knew or should 
have known of the possibility of medical negligence. Lastly, the 
trial court abused its discretion by granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment because it disregarded the equitable 
presumption created by U.C.A. 78-12-47. Thus, the trial court's 
decision granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be reversed. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BY FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE FACTS 
IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF AND 
ERRONEOUSLY FINDING THAT NO GENUINE ISSUE 
OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED. 
The standard of review that an Appellate Court must apply 
when reviewing an appeal from a summary judgment is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying the 
motion. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court, when faced with a motion for summary 
judgment, must follow the relevant Utah civil procedure rule. 
Rule 56(c) of U.R.C.P. provides that the "judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions . . . and 
[affidavits] . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Thus, according to the rule, if there is any 
genuine issue of material fact, the court, as a matter of law, 
cannot grant a summary judgment motion. 
The court's role in determining whether a motion for summary 
judgment should be granted has been further defined and documented 
in recent Utah case law. According to the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398 (Utah 
1986); Durnham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977)J Brower v. 
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Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987), the following guidelines are to 
be strictly adhered to: (1) the Court must construe the facts in 
a light most favorable to the non-moving party, (2) summary 
judgment should only be granted when the matter is clear and there 
is no room for doubt, and (3) if there is a statute governing the 
exercise of summary judgment in a particular context, the statue 
should be followed. These points may now be treated in their 
respective order. 
A. In Reviewing a Summary Judgment, the 
Court Must Construe the Facts in a 
Light Most Favorable to the Non-
Moving Party. 
The court's obligation to construe the facts in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party is well settled and undisputed. 
In Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court explicitly declared and outlined the 
guideline: 
"In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court 
will view the facts in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion and will 
allow the summary judgment to stand only if 
the movant is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law on the undisputed facts." 
Id. at 1399. See also Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d at 759. 
This guideline is particularly applicable to the instant 
case. In granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the 
district court clearly did not construe the facts in the light 
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most favorable to Plaintiff. Indeed, it may be confidently stated 
that the district court did not construe the facts as presented by 
Plaintiff in any way, but instead, summarily rejected them. Had 
the court construed the facts in a light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, it would have found that there was a genuine and 
material, factual dispute as to whether Holli Mahoskey knew or 
should have known, in July of 1985, that the injury which she had 
suffered was caused by Dr. Farr's and Dr. Christensen's negligent 
diagnosis. This disputed issue alone would have been enough to 
demonstrate that Defendants did not meet their burden of proof on 
their motion for summary judgment. Thus, the district court 
abused its discretion in granting Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. 
B. Summary Judgment Should be Granted 
Only When the Matter is Clear and 
There is No Room for Doubt. 
The Utah Supreme Court set out general parameters further 
explaining when a motion for summary judgment should and should 
not be granted in Durnham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). 
In that case the Court asserted: 
"Summary judgment . . . should not be done on 
conjecture, but only when the matter is clear; 
and in the case of doubt, the doubt should be 
resolved in allowing the challenged party the 
opportunity of at least attempting to prove 
his right to recover . . .[U]nless the court 
is able to conclude that there is no dispute 
on material facts . . . the court should not 
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summarily . . . render judgment . . . as a 
matter of law." 
Id. at 1338. (Emphasis added). 
Relevant to the preceding guideline, the Utah Supreme Court 
in the recent case of Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 
P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), stated that "close calls" on factual issues 
"are for juries, not judges, to make." Id. at 1186. Thus, 
summary judgment is not appropriate unless the parties' affidavits 
and other instruments make it clear that no genuine issue remains 
as to matters of material fact. 
These guidelines are also specifically significant to the 
present case. It is not clear whether Holli Mahoskey should have 
or even could have known that her injury was caused by her 
doctors' negligence. What is clear is that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact when those facts are construed in a light 
most favorable to Plaintiff. Even if the existence of a material 
factual issue was a "close call," the district court should have 
given Plaintiff the opportunity to have her day in court and 
attempt to prove her right to recover. Whether she should have, 
or even could have known that her injury was caused by another 
party's negligence is an issue for the jury. Thus, the district 
court abused its discretion in not allowing Plaintiff the 
opportunity to prove her right to recover. 
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C. Because of the Bifurcated Trial 
Statute, U.C.A. section 78-12-47, 
the Utah Supreme Court Disfavors 
Granting Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment in Medical 
Malpractice Cases, Where the Issue 
is the Running of the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The Utah legislature has codified the procedure to be 
followed when the issue of the running of a statute of limitations 
arises in a medical malpractice context. Section 78-12-47 of the 
Utah Code Annotated provides that if, in malpractice actions, "the 
defendant pleads that the action is barred by the statute of 
limitations, the issue raised thereby may be tried separately and 
before any other issues in the case are tried." 
In Brower v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 1337 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained the presumption the statute creates and 
its effect on summary judgment motions where the running of the 
statute of limitations was at issue. Concerning the statute, the 
Court stated: 
"This provision meets the same policy concerns 
as a grant of summary judgment based on the 
expiration of a statutory limitation period. 
Like summary judgment, it eliminates the need 
for defendants to litigate stale claims on 
substantive grounds when the trier of fact 
ultimately finds that the statute has run; 
however, unlike summary judgment, it does not 
bar the trier of fact from making a factual 
determination as to the running of the 
statute. Thus, the interests of both parties 
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are balanced better by the statutory provision 
than by the grant of summary judgment." 
Id. at 1337. Because the Court was concerned with balancing the 
interests of opposing parties, it emphasized the importance of 
factual determinations to be made by triers of fact in medical 
malpractice actions. The Court re-emphasized this point when it 
later declared that the statutory provision "supportTedl the view 
that the determination of when the plaintiff should have 
discovered the legal injury fwasl a question for the trier of 
fact. " Id. at 1339. Thus, the Court properly focused on 
balancing and fairly serving the just interests of both parties. 
Serving the interests of both parties, providing equity and 
fairness as justice requires, is of paramount importance to any 
court. Equity and justice are at issue in the case at hand. 
According to the cited statute and its application as explained by 
the Utah Supreme Court, both Plaintiff's and Defendants' interests 
would be balanced better if Holli Mahoskey was lawfully granted 
her right to her day in court. 
In summary, the trial court erred when it granted Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment because: (1) it did not construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, (2) the 
issue on which summary judgment was granted was not clear, and (3) 
the bifurcated trial statute, U.C.A. section 78-12-47, creates the 
presumption that the non-moving party should have its day in court 
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when the issue is the running of the statute of limitations in 
medical malpractice actions. Therefore, the trial court erred 
when it granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
POINT II 
A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS 
TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS AWARE OF FACTS THAT 
WOULD HAVE LED HER TO CONCLUDE THERE WAS A 
REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT HER INJURY WAS 
CAUSED BY DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE. 
As illustrated above, the trial court abused its discretion 
when it granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants by holding 
that the statute of limitations had run since Plaintiff, Holli 
Mahoskey, knew or should have known that the injury she received 
was a result of medical malpractice more than two years before she 
filed her intent to commence an action. In Foil v. Ballinqer, 601 
P. 2d 144 (Utah 1979) , the Utah Supreme Court created a test 
whereby Utah courts can determine when the statute of limitations 
begins to run in medical malpractice actions. 
A. The "Foil" Legal Injury Test, Which Indicates 
When the Statute of Limitation Begins to Run, 
as Modified by Deschamps, Requires the 
Plaintiff to Know of Facts That Would Lead Her 
to Conclude There was a Reasonable Possibility 
That Her Injury was Caused by the Negligence 
of Defendants. 
The statute governing when malpractice actions may be brought 
against health care providers is found in Utah Code Ann. section 
78-14-4. The statute provides in relevant part: 
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"(1) No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the* 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the 
date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or 
occurrence . . . " 
Interpreting the statute, the Utah Supreme Court in Foil held 
that for policy reasons, the statutory term "injury" meant "legal 
injury." Id. at 147. It then held that the statute of limitations 
would begin to run "when an injured person [knew] or should [have 
known] that he had suffered a legal injury." Id. Finally, the 
Court defined "legal injury'" creating a two-pronged test, the use 
of which rendered the application of the statute more equitable. 
The Court stated the test as follows: ". . . the two-year 
provision does not commence to run until the injured person knew 
or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by negligent action." Id. at 148. (Emphasis 
added). This test is hereinafter referred to as the "Foil" test. 
The Court explained several policy reasons justifying its 
attempt to administer justice and equity in developing the Foil 
test's second prong: (1) to compensate for the great disparity in 
medical knowledge between doctors and patients, (2) to prevent 
punishing the untutored, average layperson for his inability to 
recognize apparent connections between treatment provided and 
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injury suffered, (3) to avoid the filing of unfounded claims for 
the sole purpose of preventing the statue of limitations from 
running, and (4) to prevent health providers from making attempts 
to suppress knowledge of medical mistakes. See Foil, at 147, 
148. See also Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473 (Utah App. 
1989). 
The most recent case dealing with the issue of the statute of 
limitations in medical malpractice actions is Deschamps v. Pulley. 
There, a daughter brought an medical malpractice action against a 
doctor for negligent medical treatment given to her mother which 
subsequently caused her mother's death. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that since the plaintiff knew of the legal injury more 
than two years before she filed the action, her claim was barred 
by the statute of limitations. The Court also cited, in addition 
to the Foil test, a more specific and refined test developed by 
the United States District Court, D. Utah. Central Division, in 
Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (1984). The refinement was 
developed to resolve a confusion which had plagued the Foil test 
since its inception. That confusion involved the distinction 
between "legal injury" and "legal conclusion of negligence." The 
United States District Court stated that a legal determination of 
negligence was not necessary to start the statute of limitations; 
"Rather, the crucial question [was] whether 
the plaintiff was aware of the facts that 
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would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that they may have a cause of action against 
the health provider. Those facts include the* 
existence of an injury, its cause and the 
possibility of negligence." 
Harqett, at 155. This test shall hereinafter be referred to as 
the "Deschamps" test. Among the new elements added to the Foil 
test language by the Deschamps test were the terms "aware of 
facts," "reasonable person" and "possibility of negligence." The 
addition of these new terms, like the addition of the second prong 
of the Foil test, should also be viewed as an attempt to render 
the statute's application more equitable. An analysis of these 
new terms will increase the intelligibility of both tests. The 
terms will be analyzed in their respective order; the first term 
to be treated is "awareness of facts." 
The Deschamps test equates its term, "awareness of facts," 
with the Foil test's term, "knowledge of negligence." In 
Deschamps, the Utah Supreme Court focused on the narrow question 
presented—"knowledge of negligence." Deschamps, at 473. Two 
paragraphs later, the Court, citing Harqett stated, "the crucial 
question is whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts that 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may have* a 
cause of action against the health care provider." Id. (Emphasis 
added). Thus, the Court equated "awareness of facts" to "knowledge 
of negligence," meaning actual "knowledge of medical negligence." 
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This conclusion is affirmed by the language the Court uses after 
citing Hargett, wherein it continues to use the term, "knowledge 
of negligence." See Id, Such usage emphasizes the requirement 
that a plaintiff have knowledge, not mere suspicion, of the 
medical negligence which caused his or her injury for the statute 
of limitations to run. See Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 604 
(10th Cir. 1983) ("Mere suspicions or the possibility of a 
plaintiff having factual knowledge is not enough to cause the 
statute of limitations to run in favor of the defendants.") The 
new term "reasonable person" may now be reviewed. 
A "reasonableness" requirement is also emphasized in 
Deschamps. As stated above, the Deschamps test expressly included 
the element of reasonableness by referring to what a reasonable 
person would conclude from certain facts. The Foil court also 
imposed a "reasonableness" requirement by requiring the injured 
person to exercise "reasonable diligence" in determining the 
nature and cause of his or her injury. See Foily 601 P.2d at 149. 
To make the test rationally consistent, the characteristic of 
reasonableness should also attach to and qualify the new term, 
"possibility of negligence." 
Depending on its interpretation, the Deschamps test's third 
new term, "possibility of negligence," renders the whole test 
either internally inconsistent or objectively reasonable. If the 
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term is not qualified by reasonableness, then any possibility of 
negligence would be sufficient to bring a cause of action, 
regardless of how remote that possibility might be. Since the 
practice of medicine is not an exact science, there is always the 
remote possibility that a medical professional has been negligent 
when his care seems to result in or fails to stop ci particular 
injury. Even if medical negligence merely appears to exist in a 
particular case, human nature often pushes a person to blame the 
medical professional for his troubles, whether placing that blame 
is justified or not. Moreover, not only is there always a remote 
possibility of negligence, but a "remote possibility" 
interpretation directly contradicts the Utah Supreme Court's 
policy reasons for developing the second prong of the Foil test to 
begin with. Indeed, if a remote possibility of medical negligence 
were sufficient grounds for legal action, a claimant would be 
deemed to have knowledge of the possibility of negligence when he 
had knowledge of the injury, and the second prong of the Foil test 
would thus become meaningless and useless. 
However, if the term "possibility of negligence" is 
interpreted to mean "reasonable possibility of negligence," then 
the internal consistency of the Foil test, the definitive 
Deschamps supplement and the integrity of the Utah Supreme Court 
is preserved. The consistency of the Foil test would be preserved 
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because reasonable persons should know of reasonable possibilities 
of medical negligence. The Deschamps test would be internally 
consistent because it would not require reasonable, injured 
laypersons to be aware of and responsible for "unreasonable" or 
"remote" possibilities of medical negligence. The integrity of 
the Utah Supreme Court would be preserved because, by adopting the 
"reasonable possibility" clause, the second prong of the Foil test 
would still be rational, equitable and viable. Thus, the 
possibilities of medical negligence for which plaintiffs should be 
accountable and those which would trigger the statute of 
limitations to run should be "reasonable" possibilities, not 
"remote" ones. 
In summary, pursuant to the Foil test as modified by 
Deschamps, where the issue concerns Utah Code Ann. section 78-14-4 
and the commencing of its statutory two year limitations period, 
justice and equity require the following: The two year statute of 
limitations period should not commence to run until the injured 
person (1) knows or should know that she has sustained an injury, 
and (2) knows, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should know of the existence of a reasonable possibility of 
medical negligence. 
B. Application of the Foil/Deschamps 
Standard to the Instant Case. 
Application of the Foil/Deschamps standard to the instant 
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case demonstrates that the statute of limitations had not run when 
Plaintiff, Hollie Mahoskey, brought her claim against Defendants. 
The first prong of the test is not in dispute. In late July of 
1985, Holli knew or should have known she had suffered a physical 
injury. On July 19, 1985, Holli's right breast was completely 
removed because the lump previously diagnosed by Defendants was 
"clearly cancerous." (R 9, 84, 129). Later, in August of 1985, 
Dr. Wagnon told Holli that if her cancer could have been 
discovered earlier, it could possibly have been treated with less 
drastic treatment. (R. 159). Thus, only the second prong of the 
test is in dispute here. 
Plaintiff did not know nor did she have reason to know of the 
existence of a reasonable possibility of medical negligence, even 
though she exercised reasonable diligence in trying to determine 
if she had been a victim of it. In fact, Plaintiff's situation is 
the type which the Utah Supreme Court tried to prot€>ct when it 
decided the Foil v. Ballinqer case. 
"In the health care field it is typically the 
case that there often is a great disparity in 
the knowledge of those who provide health care 
services and those who receive the services 
with respect to expected and unexpected side 
effects of a given procedure, as well as the 
nature, degree and extent of expected aft€>r 
effects. While the recipient may be aware of 
a disability or dysfunction, there may be, to 
the untutored understanding of the average 
layman, no apparent connection between the 
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treatment provided by a physician and the 
injury suffered." 
Foil at 147. A closer review of the facts will illustrate the 
applicability of the Court's language. 
As stated in the facts, on April 3, 1985, Holli was examined 
and treated by not one, but two doctors. (R. 1, 147-150). 
Independently, each doctor employed the same examination method 
and each doctor reached the same conclusion: the lump in Holli's 
breast was not and could not be cancerous. (R. 151). She had no 
medical background and no reason to question or doubt the 
information she received from the two doctors or the procedures 
they performed. Indeed, she deeply trusted Defendant Dr. Farr 
because he had been her physician for a number of years and he had 
always given her good care. (R. 147, 161). She believed him. 
She also followed his instruction and continued to monitor the 
lump in her breast for signs of cancer. Nor was she aware of 
the further procedures routinely performed in these circumstances 
to verify the diagnosis, which were not performed in her behalf. 
In July of 1985, Holli noticed that the lump was larger and 
very sensitive and sore. (R. 197). On July 17, 1985, Holli was 
examined by Dr. James Gardner who, after performing a biopsy, 
informed Holli that the lump was clearly cancerous. (R 197). Two 
days later, Holli underwent modified radical mastectomy surgery 
and her right breast was completely removed. (R 197). After the 
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surgery, Holli had frequent contact with two other doctors; Dr. 
Wagnon, who supervised her chemotherapy and Dr. Monson who 
performed Holli's sterilization therapy. (R 197). 
As the uncontested facts indicate, Holli questioned these 
doctors regarding the care she received from Defendants Farr and 
Christensen, desiring to know if cancer could have and should have 
been detected earlier. Yet each time she inquired, she was either 
told that they did not know, or she was told nothing at all. (R 
197). As was stated above, Dr. Wagnon told Holli that if the 
cancer could have been discovered earlier, less drastic measures 
may have been sufficient for treating the cancer, but he was not 
sure. (R 198). This response did not answer Holli's question of 
whether tjie cancer could have been discovered earlier, but only 
informed her of a well known general medical principle.', i.e., the 
earlier that a disease is discovered, the less drastic will be the 
measures necessary to solve the problem. What Holli needed was 
information or facts from which she could conclude there was a 
reasonable possibility of medical negligence on the part of 
Defendants Farr and Christensen. Neither Dr. Wagnon's recitation 
nor the responses from her other doctors revealed to Holli any 
such facts or information. Thus, even after Holli discovered she 
had breast cancer, she still was not aware of facts which gave her 
knowledge or should have given her knowledge of a reasonable 
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possibility that Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen had been negligent 
in failing to diagnose such cancer in April of 1985. 
Comparing the instant case to the Deschamps case reveals 
significant factual variations. It may be recalled that in the 
Deschamps case, a daughter brought an action for the negligent 
medical treatment of her mother, Mrs. Schulz. Mrs. Schulz died 
because a regimen of drugs prescribed by her doctor, caused her to 
contract the fatal disease vasculitis. Ms. Deschamps retained an 
attorney to investigate the situation even before Mrs. Schulz' 
death. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment, 
holding that Ms. Deschamps knew or should have known of the legal 
injury which was the basis of her action more than two years 
before we filed her action. Deschamps, 784 P.2d at 473. 
The Court found that in October of 1984, at the time of her 
mother's death, Ms. Deschamps was aware of or should have been 
aware of the facts and information regarding her mother's disease 
and subsequent death. By reviewing and comparing Mrs. Schulz' 
medical records with the medical literature on vasculitis over a 
two month period, Ms. Deschamps' attorney acquired for Ms. 
Deschamps, information which was sufficient to commence the 
running of the statute of limitations period under U.C.A. 78-14-4. 
Id. 
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In the instant case, as stated above, Holli Mahoskey had no 
facts in her possession, other than her personal knowledge as a 
layperson, from which to form a conclusion about the possibility 
of negligence on the part of her doctors, until August of 1988. 
At that time, for the first time, she* had an opportunity to 
conduct an inquiry into the possibility of negligence. Only then 
did she obtain information and facts sufficient to commence the 
running of the statute of limitations. 
Moreover, Holli's situation varies from the Peschamps case 
because the alleged negligence arose from a failure to diagnose, 
rather than from negligent administration of treatment, A causal 
connection between negligent medical care and physical injury is 
certainly more obvious where treatment has been positively 
rendered and is followed by an adverse medical condition which did 
not exist until after the treatment was given. In the* case of a 
negligent diagnosis, the causal connection between negligent 
medical care and physical injury may never be recognized. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court stated this principle in Metzger v. Kalke, 
709 P.2d 414 (Wyo. 1985). 
"In cases involving an undiagnosed affliction 
especially, the patient may not discover the 
wrong until so informed by another doctor: 
The question of malpractice in a diagnostic 
situation is often dependent upon when the 
plaintiff is informed by another physician 
that the original diagnosis was wrong and 
whether if a correct diagnosis had been made 
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and treatment rendered the ultimate result 
would have changed. Moreover, the fact that 
plaintiff obtains a correct diagnosis does not 
necessarily constitute notice that the earlier 
incorrect diagnosis was rendered 
negligently." (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 419. Although Metzger may not be factually identical to 
the instant case, the principle it contains is valid beyond the 
case's restricted facts. It was not reasonable to require a 
layperson such as Holli to make a causal connection between 
Defendants' failure to diagnose her cancer and any possible injury 
she may have suffered as a result, without first obtaining further 
information from some educated source. 
Shortly after her surgery, in August of 1985, Holli began 
the gruelling journey through chemotherapy. (R 154). She 
suffered severe and continuous side effects as a result. She was 
plagued by physical illnesses since her immune system was severely 
weakened by the treatment. In addition, even after she recovered 
physically from the cancer and its treatment, Holli suffered 
emotional and mental disturbances and distress. Because of the 
physical, emotional and mental distress brought on by her cancer 
and subsequent treatment, Holli was unable to function normally 
for almost three years, until approximately August of 1988. At 
this time, she was able to put her life back together, return to 
work, investigate the possibility of plastic surgery, and further 
investigate the possibility of negligence on the part of 
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Defendants. In light of the extreme physical, emotional and 
mental difficulties Holli suffered as a result of her cancer and 
its subsequent treatment, it was reasonable diligence on her part 
to postpone further investigation of the possibility of 
Defendants' negligence until August of 1988. Therefore, the 
statute of limitations did not commence until September of 1988, 
when Holli discovered through reasonable diligence that there was 
a possibility of the Defendants' negligence. 
After such a prolonged and incapacitating experience, Holli 
felt anger toward Defendants Farr and Christensen, and 
understandably so. After all, they had told her that the lump 
could not be cancerous. Understandably, she felt some suspicion 
as to whether they had been negligent in her regard. A 
layperson's suspicion and anger are not the equivalent of an 
awareness of facts constituting medical knowledge of the 
possibility of medical negligence. See Vest v. Bossard at 604. 
(Mere suspicions or the possibility of a [p]laintiff having 
factual knowledge is not enough to cause the statute of 
limitations to run in favor of the defendants). As her feelings 
of anger and suspicion indicate, Holli, like most humans, desired 
to blame someone for her situation, whether the blame was 
justifiably placed or not. But in order for the statute of 
limitations to commence in a medical malpractice action, the law 
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requires more than mere unfounded suspicion and anger. The law 
requires knowledge of a reasonable possibility of medical 
negligence. If the Court finds that Holli's suspicions were 
sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations, 
then there can be no legal difference between what a frustrated 
layperson thinks and what an educated medical expert knows. Thus, 
the statute of limitations could not have commenced until 
September of 1988 when Holli, having recovered from her traumatic 
experience, consulted with an attorney for the first time and 
obtained a reasonable knowledge of the possibility of a negligent 
diagnosis. 
To preserve the public policy rationale first developed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Foil, the Court must find that the 
statute of limitations has not run. A contrary decision would 
discredit the Court's well reasoned and consistently heeded Foil 
opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion and consequently erred 
in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court 
did not construe the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, 
the non-moving party, nor was the case so clear that the court 
could determine that no genuine issues of material fact existed. 
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Further, the court disregarded the presumption created by U.C.A. 
section 78-12-47 which disfavors summary judgments on the issue of 
the running of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice 
actions. Moreover, the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment and consequently barring Plaintiff's action because 
Plaintiff, as an untutored layperson, did not know, nor by 
exercising reasonable diligence could she have known that she was 
the victim of medical malpractice. Therefore, the trial court's 
decision granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment should 
be reversed and Plaintiff given her right to have her day in court 
as justice and equity so require. 
Respectfully submitted this uly, 1990. 
DOUGLAS\M. DUKBAfiO 
PAUL H^JUOHNSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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